Problem Definition
Northstar Retail Group operates 142 full-line department stores across the U.S. Midwest and Northeast, selling apparel, beauty, accessories and home goods, together with a fast-growing website and app. Revenue was $6.8 billion in 2025, down from $7.2 billion in 2021, after the closure of underperforming stores.
Over the same four years, Northstar has transformed its channel mix. Digital sales rose from 18% to 34% of revenue, in line with peers: Macy's reported that digital sales were approximately 35% of net sales in 2025, and Kohl's reported digital penetration of approximately 29%. Across U.S. retail, e-commerce reached approximately 17.1% of total sales in the second quarter of 2026 and grew approximately 12.2% year on year, against approximately 6.7% for total retail. Meanwhile, U.S. department-store sales have been shrinking for a decade, from approximately $165 billion in 2015 to approximately $131 billion in 2024.
The board expected digital growth to protect profits. The opposite has happened: Northstar's operating margin fell from 6.1% in 2021 to 2.4% in 2025, even though HQ overhead was cut by more than $100 million. Peers are under pressure too: Macy's gross margin was approximately 38.0% in 2025 and its operating margin approximately 4.6%, helped by a one-off legal settlement gain.
The new CEO has asked your team: Why is Northstar's profit falling as online sales grow, and what should it do to restore a 5% operating margin within three years without giving up its digital growth?
Additional InformationAsk for dataInterviewer’s data
If asked, please share that:
- Northstar's digital channel has two fulfillment methods: ship-to-home (from two distribution centers) and buy online, pick up in store (BOPIS)
- Ship-to-home is 27% of total revenue and BOPIS 7%; stores (walk-in sales) are 66%
- In 2023 Northstar lowered its free-shipping threshold from $75 to $25 to match competitors
- UPS and FedEx both raised list rates by an average of approximately 5.9% for 2026 (for UPS, the third year in a row at that level); FedEx's residential surcharge rose approximately 8.4%, and industry analysts estimate shippers' real cost increase at approximately 7--12% once surcharges are included
- According to the NRF, approximately 19.3% of U.S. online sales were expected to be returned in 2025, against approximately 15.8% of total retail sales
Question 1Structuring
How would you structure your analysis of why Northstar's margin has fallen as online sales have grown?
Hint · Structuring
Build 3–4 branches that are specific to this client and question, not a generic framework. Check they don't overlap and together cover the problem.
Additional InformationAsk for dataInterviewer’s data
- Share only if asked: Northstar reports one consolidated P&L; there is no channel P&L today. Finance allocates all fulfillment, shipping and digital marketing to "SG&A"
Try it first, then checkCheck my answerModel answer
1. Revenue and mix
- a) Total revenue trend (store closures, like-for-like sales)
- b) Channel mix: stores vs. ship-to-home vs. BOPIS
- c) Category mix by channel (beauty and home vs. apparel, which has the highest return rates)
2. Channel profitability (rate)
- a) Gross margin by channel: price, promotions, markdowns
- b) Store costs: labor, occupancy, payment fees
- c) Online order economics: average order value (AOV), pick and pack, shipments per order, carrier rate, shipping revenue, returns, digital marketing
- d) BOPIS economics: store picking labor, add-on purchases when customers collect
3. Fixed costs and deleverage
- a) HQ overhead, distribution center fixed costs, technology, depreciation
- b) Store occupancy spread over falling walk-in sales
4. External drivers
- a) Carrier rate increases and surcharges
- b) Industry return rates and customer expectations (free shipping, free returns)
- c) Competitor free-shipping policies
What the interviewer is looking forInterviewer’s viewInterviewer’s view
Look for a structure that separates mix (more sales in a channel with different economics) from rate (each channel becoming less profitable) and from fixed-cost deleverage. A generic "revenue minus costs" tree is only a starting point.
- Good candidates build a profitability tree and list channel-specific costs (shipping, returns, fulfillment, marketing)
- Strong candidates ask for a channel P&L and split the analysis into mix vs. rate vs. overhead
- Excellent candidates go down to the unit of the online business, the order, and list the drivers of order economics (average order value, shipments per order, carrier rate, return rate, shipping revenue, marketing per order); they also note that a missing channel P&L is itself a root cause, since the company cannot see the problem
"So What?" Cascade:
- Level 1 (surface): Online has different costs from stores
- Level 2 (implication): Profit can fall because of mix (a lower-margin channel growing) or because the online channel's own margin fell; the two need different answers
- Level 3 (actionable insight): Build the channel P&L first and then analyze online per order, because the order is where decisions such as the free-shipping threshold, split shipments and return policy act
Question 2Numeracy
Finance has now built a first channel P&L. Using Exhibit 1, calculate the contribution of each channel and Northstar's operating profit. What do you conclude?
Hint · Numeracy
Write the formula before you plug in numbers, keep units and zeros explicit, and sanity-check the order of magnitude at the end.
Exhibit 1Channel Economics per $100 of Net Sales (2025)
| Per $100 of net sales | Stores (walk-in) | Online: ship-to-home | Online: BOPIS |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gross margin | 40.0 | 36.0 | 38.0 |
| Store labor (incl. returns handling) | (12.0) | --- | --- |
| Store picking labor | --- | --- | (3.0) |
| Store occupancy | (8.0) | --- | --- |
| DC pick and pack | --- | (5.8) | --- |
| Net shipping (carrier cost less shipping fees collected) | --- | (14.0) | --- |
| Returns processing | --- | (3.0) | (1.5) |
| Digital marketing | --- | (8.2) | (4.0) |
| Payment fees | (2.0) | (2.0) | (2.0) |
| Channel contribution | ? | ? | ? |
| Share of 2025 revenue | 66% | 27% | 7% |
Revenue 2025: $6.8B. Overhead not allocated to channels (HQ, distribution-center fixed costs, technology, depreciation): $830M. BOPIS carries no occupancy charge because it uses existing store space.
Source: Northstar Retail Group case file
Additional InformationAsk for dataInterviewer’s data
- Share only if the candidate asks for a comparison with 2021: revenue $7.2B; mix stores 82%, ship-to-home 15%, BOPIS 3%; channel contribution per $100 in 2021: stores 19.5, ship-to-home 15.1, BOPIS 27.5; overhead $935M
Try it first, then checkCheck my answerModel answer
Step 1: Channel contribution per $100
- Stores: 40.0 − 12.0 − 8.0 − 2.0 = $18.0
- Ship-to-home: 36.0 − 5.8 − 14.0 − 3.0 − 8.2 − 2.0 = $3.0
- BOPIS: 38.0 − 3.0 − 1.5 − 4.0 − 2.0 = $27.5
Step 2: Contribution in dollars
- Stores: $6.8B × 66% = $4,488M revenue × 18.0% = approximately $807.8M
- Ship-to-home: $6.8B × 27% = $1,836M × 3.0% = approximately $55.1M
- BOPIS: $6.8B × 7% = $476M × 27.5% = approximately $130.9M
- Total contribution: approximately $993.8M (14.6% of revenue)
Step 3: Operating profit
- $993.8M − $830M overhead = approximately $163.8M
- Operating margin: $163.8M / $6,800M = approximately 2.4%, which matches the reported figure
Step 4: Insights
- Ship-to-home: 27% of revenue, only $55.1M / $993.8M = approximately 5.5% of contribution
- Digital as a whole: 34% of revenue, ($55.1M + $130.9M) / $993.8M = approximately 18.7% of contribution
- Every 1 point of revenue ($68M) that moves from stores to ship-to-home costs $68M × (18.0% − 3.0%) = approximately $10.2M of operating profit
Stretch: 2021 vs. 2025 bridge (if the candidate asks for 2021 data)
- 2021 contribution: $7.2B × (82% × 19.5 + 15% × 15.1 + 3% × 27.5)% = $7.2B × 19.08% = approximately $1,373.8M; less $935M overhead = approximately $438.8M (6.1% margin)
- Change in operating profit: $163.8M − $438.8M = approximately −$275M, made up of:
- Ship-to-home margin collapse (15.1 → 3.0 on 2025 sales of $1,836M): approximately −$222.2M
- Store margin decline (19.5 → 18.0 on $4,488M): approximately −$67.3M
- Lower revenue and mix, at 2021 margins ($1,283.3M vs. $1,373.8M): approximately −$90.5M
- Lower overhead ($935M → $830M): +$105M
- Conclusion: the collapse of ship-to-home unit economics explains most of the decline; channel mix at 2021 margins would have cost far less
What the interviewer is looking forInterviewer’s viewInterviewer’s view
The calculation is simple; what matters is the conclusion. Ship-to-home is more than a quarter of revenue but earns almost nothing. BOPIS, which uses the same website, is the most profitable channel in the company.
- Good candidates calculate the three contributions and operating profit correctly
- Strong candidates express the result as shares: ship-to-home is 27% of revenue but only approximately 5.5% of contribution; each $1 that moves from a store sale to a ship-to-home sale costs approximately 15 cents of profit
- Excellent candidates ask for 2021 and build a margin bridge, showing that the fall is mainly a rate problem (ship-to-home economics collapsed) rather than a mix problem
"So What?" Cascade:
- Level 1 (surface): Ship-to-home earns only $3 per $100 of sales
- Level 2 (implication): "Online" is not the problem: BOPIS earns $27.50 per $100, more than stores. The problem is one fulfillment method
- Level 3 (actionable insight): The goal is not to slow digital growth, but to fix ship-to-home order economics and move digital demand toward BOPIS
Question 3Judgement & Insights
Exhibit 2 shows the economics of an average ship-to-home order in 2021 and 2025. What has happened, and what is the root cause?
Hint · Judgement & Insights
Read the exhibit title, axes and units first. Lead with the ‘so what’, then back it with one or two numbers.
Exhibit 2Average Ship-to-Home Order Economics, 2021 vs. 2025
| Metric | 2021 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|
| Ship-to-home orders (millions) | 9.0 | 18.4 |
| Average order value (AOV, net of discounts) | $120 | $100 |
| Items per order | 3.1 | 2.3 |
| Free-shipping threshold | $75 | $25 (since 2023) |
| Shipping fees collected per order | $3.60 | $1.00 |
| Shipments (boxes) per order | 1.2 | 1.5 |
| Carrier cost per shipment | $8.50 | $10.00 |
| DC pick and pack per order | $5.40 | $5.80 |
| Return rate (% of orders) | 17% | 24% |
| Processing cost per return | $10.00 | $12.50 |
| Digital marketing per order | $9.60 | $8.20 |
| Gross margin (% of AOV) | 36.5% | 36.0% |
| Payment fees (% of AOV) | 2.0% | 2.0% |
Carrier cost per shipment is Northstar's blended cost after negotiated discounts.
Source: Northstar Retail Group case file
Try it first, then checkCheck my answerModel answer
Step 1: Contribution per order
| Per order | 2021 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|
| Gross margin | $120 × 36.5% = $43.80 | $100 × 36.0% = $36.00 |
| Pick and pack | ($5.40) | ($5.80) |
| Net shipping | 1.2 × $8.50 − $3.60 = ($6.60) | 1.5 × $10.00 − $1.00 = ($14.00) |
| Returns | 17% × $10.00 = ($1.70) | 24% × $12.50 = ($3.00) |
| Digital marketing | ($9.60) | ($8.20) |
| Payment fees | ($2.40) | ($2.00) |
| Contribution | $18.10 (15.1% of AOV) | $3.00 (3.0% of AOV) |
These match the channel contributions in Exhibit 1 and the 2021 figure.
Step 2: Margin bridge, % of AOV (15.1% → 3.0%)
- Net shipping: 5.5% → 14.0% = −8.5 pts
- Returns: 1.4% → 3.0% = −1.6 pts
- Pick and pack: 4.5% → 5.8% = −1.3 pts
- Digital marketing: 8.0% → 8.2% = −0.2 pts
- Gross margin: 36.5% → 36.0% = −0.5 pts
- Total: approximately −12.1 pts
Step 3: Why did net shipping rise $7.40 per order ($6.60 → $14.00)?
- Lost shipping fees: $3.60 − $1.00 = $2.60 (the $25 threshold makes almost every order free)
- More boxes per order: (1.5 − 1.2) × $10.00 = $3.00 (smaller, more frequent orders picked from several locations)
- Higher carrier rate: 1.2 × ($10.00 − $8.50) = $1.80
- Total: $7.40. Carrier rates explain only approximately a quarter; approximately three quarters comes from Northstar's own threshold and fulfillment decisions
Step 4: Root cause
- The 2023 threshold cut drove smaller baskets (AOV $120 → $100, items 3.1 → 2.3), removed shipping income and increased split shipments; fixed per-order costs are now spread over a smaller basket
- The return rate of 24% is well above the approximately 19.3% U.S. online average, which suggests a free-returns policy with no friction, and probably customers ordering several sizes
- Carrier increases (approximately 5.9% list increases a year) are real but a secondary driver; Northstar's blended rate rose approximately 18% in four years, less than list prices, thanks to negotiated discounts
What the interviewer is looking forInterviewer’s viewInterviewer’s view
The trap is to blame "rising shipping rates", which is what management believes. Carrier rates did rise, but that explains a minority of the cost increase. Most of the damage was self-inflicted: the lower free-shipping threshold made baskets smaller, removed shipping income and increased split shipments. The candidate should work per order and then convert to a percentage of AOV, since AOV itself fell.
- Good candidates compute contribution per order for both years and identify net shipping as the largest driver
- Strong candidates split the rise in net shipping cost into its three causes and show that carrier rates are the smallest
- Excellent candidates connect the cause to the 2023 threshold decision (smaller baskets, more boxes, no shipping income) and note the return rate is well above the NRF online average of approximately 19.3%, making returns the second target
"So What?" Cascade:
- Level 1 (surface): Shipping cost per order more than doubled and ship-to-home contribution fell from approximately 15% to 3% of sales
- Level 2 (implication): Only $1.80 of the $7.40 rise in net shipping per order comes from carrier rates; $5.60 comes from Northstar's own decisions (lost shipping fees and more boxes per order), driven by the $25 threshold
- Level 3 (actionable insight): The margin is recoverable with policy and operations levers Northstar controls (threshold, order consolidation, returns policy, BOPIS), not only by negotiating with carriers
Question 4Numeracy
The digital team has proposed four levers (Exhibit 3). Estimate the annual operating profit impact of each, and whether together they get Northstar to a 5% operating margin.
Hint · Numeracy
Write the formula before you plug in numbers, keep units and zeros explicit, and sanity-check the order of magnitude at the end.
Exhibit 3Proposed Ship-to-Home Levers
| Lever | Description | Expected effect (vs. 2025 base of 18.36M orders at $100 AOV) |
|---|---|---|
| A. Raise the free-shipping threshold | $25 → $49 for non-loyalty customers; loyalty members keep free shipping | Orders −8%; AOV rises to $106; shipping fees collected rise to $2.20 per order |
| B. Consolidate shipments | Reposition inventory and hold orders to ship complete | Boxes per order 1.5 → 1.2; pick and pack +$0.40 per order; one-off systems cost $15M |
| C. Returns policy | Free returns in store or for loyalty members; $6.99 mail-return fee for others | Return rate 24% → 21%; processing cost per return $12.50 → $10.50 |
| D. Push BOPIS | $3 credit for choosing store pickup | 10% of ship-to-home orders switch to BOPIS (same $100 AOV) |
Treat each lever independently against the 2025 base. Other costs per order unchanged unless stated. Payment fees remain 2% of AOV.
Source: Northstar Retail Group case file
Additional InformationAsk for dataInterviewer’s data
- 2025 ship-to-home orders: $1,836M / $100 = 18.36M orders; contribution $3.00 per order = $55.1M
- BOPIS contribution: $27.50 per $100 order (Exhibit 1)
- Target: 5% operating margin on approximately $6.8B = approximately $340M; 2025 operating profit $163.8M
Try it first, then checkCheck my answerModel answer
Lever A: Raise the free-shipping threshold
- New orders: 18.36M × 92% = approximately 16.89M
- New contribution per order: gross margin $106 × 36% = $38.16; less pick and pack $5.80, net shipping 1.5 × $10.00 − $2.20 = $12.80, returns $3.00, marketing $8.20, payment fees $106 × 2% = $2.12; total costs $31.92
- Contribution: $38.16 − $31.92 = $6.24 per order × 16.89M = approximately $105.4M
- Impact: $105.4M − $55.1M = approximately +$50.3M
- Note: ship-to-home revenue falls from $1,836M to 16.89M × $106 = approximately $1,790M (−$45.5M): less revenue, more profit
Lever B: Consolidate shipments
- Saving per order: 0.3 fewer boxes × $10.00 = $3.00; less extra pick and pack $0.40 = $2.60
- Impact: $2.60 × 18.36M = approximately +$47.7M per year; $15M one-off cost pays back in approximately 4 months
Lever C: Returns policy
- Returns cost per order: 21% × $10.50 = $2.21 vs. $3.00 today; saving approximately $0.80 per order
- Impact: $0.795 × 18.36M = approximately +$14.6M (before the gross margin saved on fewer returns)
Lever D: Push BOPIS
- Orders shifted: 10% × 18.36M = 1.836M
- Gain per shifted order: BOPIS $27.50 − $3.00 credit − $3.00 ship-to-home contribution lost = $21.50
- Impact: $21.50 × 1.836M = approximately +$39.5M (before extra in-store purchases by customers who come to collect)
Total and target
- Sum: $50.3M + $47.7M + $14.6M + $39.5M = approximately $152.1M
- New operating profit: $163.8M + $152.1M = approximately $315.9M
- Margin: $315.9M / $6,800M = approximately 4.6% (approximately 4.7% on the lower revenue of approximately $6,755M after Lever A)
- Gap to 5% ($340M): approximately $24M
- At 80% realization (overlaps, customer pushback): $163.8M + $121.7M = approximately $285.5M, approximately 4.2%, a gap of approximately $55M
What the interviewer is looking forInterviewer’s viewInterviewer’s view
Let the candidate choose the order in which to calculate. Lever A is the trickiest because several variables change at once; the candidate must rebuild the full order P&L. Ask the candidate to comment on interactions between levers and whether the total is realistic.
- Good candidates size three or four levers approximately correctly
- Strong candidates size all four, sum them, compare with the $340M target and recognize the remaining gap
- Excellent candidates point out that the levers overlap (A and D both reduce ship-to-home orders, so B and C then apply to fewer orders), haircut the total, note that Lever A reduces revenue while raising profit, and propose where the rest of the gap should come from
"So What?" Cascade:
- Level 1 (surface): The four levers add approximately $152M of operating profit
- Level 2 (implication): That takes the margin from 2.4% to approximately 4.6--4.7%, not 5%; with realistic overlaps (for example, 80% realization) it is closer to 4.2%
- Level 3 (actionable insight): Fixing ship-to-home is necessary but not sufficient; Northstar needs one or two further levers (Q5) worth at least $25--55M to hit 5% with a safety margin
Question 5Creativity
The levers on ship-to-home do not quite get us to 5%. What else could Northstar do to close the gap and keep digital growing profitably?
Hint · Creativity
Brainstorm in buckets (e.g. internal vs external, short vs long term) so ideas stay structured and you can see gaps.
Additional InformationAsk for dataInterviewer’s data
- Share only if asked: Northstar's loyalty program has 9 million members, and 60% of digital revenue comes from members
- Share only if asked: Northstar's digital team estimates a retail media business (selling ads on its website and app to brands) could earn approximately 1.5% of digital sales at a 70% margin
- Share only if asked: 18 of the 142 stores make negative store contribution; 40 stores are within 10 miles of another Northstar store
Try it first, then checkCheck my answerModel answer
1. Grow high-margin revenue
- Retail media: digital sales $6.8B × 34% = $2,312M; × 1.5% = approximately $34.7M revenue; × 70% margin = approximately $24.3M of profit, enough on its own to close the base-case gap
- Paid loyalty tier: free shipping and free returns for a yearly fee, which turns the shipping cost into a subscription and raises purchase frequency
- Marketplace: third-party brands sell on Northstar's site and ship themselves; Northstar earns a commission without inventory or fulfillment cost
- Private label in categories with high return rates, where fit can be standardized
2. Cut the cost per online order further
- Ship-from-store for the orders closest to a store, reducing carrier zones and boxes per order
- Returns: fit tools and size guidance for apparel, where multiple-size ordering drives returns toward the 24% rate; instant exchanges instead of refunds
- Carrier mix: regional carriers and consolidated delivery (for example, "ship next Tuesday, free") for price-sensitive customers
3. Use the stores as digital infrastructure
- Pickup lockers and curbside to lower BOPIS labor cost and raise its convenience
- Store returns for all online orders (every return that comes to a store saves the reverse shipping and brings a customer into the store)
4. Fixed costs
- Review the 18 stores with negative contribution, starting with the ones within 10 miles of another Northstar store, where sales and pickup volume can transfer
- Simplify the two distribution centers' roles as volumes move to BOPIS and ship-from-store
What the interviewer is looking forInterviewer’s viewInterviewer’s view
Look for a structured brainstorm (for example: grow profitable revenue, cut channel cost, use the store network, cut fixed costs) and at least one quantified idea. Push back on ideas that would just move the problem, such as cutting digital marketing, which would slow the growth the CEO wants to keep.
- Good candidates give 5--6 sensible ideas
- Strong candidates organize them into buckets and quantify one or two
- Excellent candidates use the store network as a digital asset (ship-from-store, returns to store, BOPIS lockers) rather than a cost, and link each idea back to the specific drivers found in Q3
Question 6Synthesis
The CEO has five minutes before the board meeting. What is your recommendation?
Hint · Synthesis
Answer first: the recommendation, two or three reasons with numbers, then risks and next steps.
Additional InformationAsk for dataInterviewer’s data
- No new data. The candidate should synthesize the prior answers.
Try it first, then checkCheck my answerModel answer
Diagnosis: Northstar's profit is not falling because customers moved online; it is falling because the ship-to-home order became unprofitable. Ship-to-home contribution fell from approximately 15% to 3% of sales, which explains approximately $222M of the $275M fall in operating profit. Three quarters of the rise in shipping cost per order came from Northstar's own decisions, mainly the 2023 cut in the free-shipping threshold to $25, not from carrier rates.
Recommendation: Keep growing digital, but change how it is fulfilled and priced.
| Lever | Annual impact | Timing |
|---|---|---|
| Consolidate shipments (1.5 → 1.2 boxes per order) | ~$48M | Months 0--9 |
| Push BOPIS (10% of ship-to-home orders) | ~$39M | Months 0--6 |
| Free-shipping threshold $49, free for loyalty members | ~$50M | Months 3--6, after loyalty messaging |
| Returns policy and fit tools | ~$15M | Months 6--12 |
| Retail media | ~$24M | Months 6--24 |
| Total | ~$176M |
- Operating profit: $163.8M + approximately $176M = approximately $340M, approximately 5.0% of revenue
- Because realization will not be 100%, keep a buffer from the store portfolio review (18 stores with negative contribution) and ship-from-store
Risks and mitigants:
- Customer backlash to the higher threshold: protect loyalty members and offer free BOPIS as the alternative; track conversion weekly and adjust the threshold ($35--49) if order loss exceeds 8%
- Competitors keep low thresholds: Northstar's advantage is 142 stores for pickup and returns, which pure online players cannot match
- Execution of shipment consolidation: start with the 20% of SKUs responsible for most split orders
Next steps:
- Make the channel P&L a permanent monthly report, with contribution per order by channel
- Launch the BOPIS credit and the shipment consolidation pilot in the next 90 days
- Test the new threshold in two regions before a national rollout
- Hire a retail media lead and sign the first three brand partners
What the interviewer is looking forInterviewer’s viewInterviewer’s view
Look for an answer-first structure: the diagnosis in one sentence, the plan with numbers, the risks and the first steps. Push back if the candidate recommends slowing digital growth, which contradicts both the CEO's brief and the analysis (BOPIS is the most profitable channel).
- Good candidates give the diagnosis and a list of levers
- Strong candidates quantify the path from 2.4% to 5% and sequence it
- Excellent candidates also address the revenue trade-off of Lever A, the risks (customer backlash, competitor free shipping) and the need for a permanent channel P&L
Data Sources
Market facts in this case are taken from the public sources below and rounded for interview math. Northstar Retail Group and all company-specific figures (revenue, channel economics, order data, levers) are fictional.
| Fact used in the case | Source |
|---|---|
| U.S. e-commerce approximately 17.1% of retail sales in Q2 2026; e-commerce +12.2% vs. total retail +6.7% year on year | U.S. Census Bureau, "Quarterly Retail E-Commerce Sales, 2nd Quarter 2026", 2026, https://www.census.gov/retail/mrts/www/data/pdf/ec_current.pdf ; Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED), "E-Commerce Retail Sales as a Percent of Total Sales (ECOMPCTSA)", 2026, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/ECOMPCTSA |
| U.S. department-store sales approximately $165B (2015) → approximately $131B (2024), sum of monthly seasonally adjusted sales | U.S. Census Bureau via FRED, "Advance Retail Sales: Department Stores (RSDSELD)", 2025, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/RSDSELD |
| Macy's digital sales approximately 35% of net sales (2025, 33% in 2024); gross margin approximately 38.0%; operating margin approximately 4.6% including a 1.4-point interchange settlement gain | Macy's, Inc., Form 10-K for fiscal year ended 31 January 2026, 2026, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/794367/000162828026021721/m-20260131.htm |
| Kohl's digital penetration approximately 29% of net sales (2025); gross margin approximately 37.5% | Kohl's Corporation, Form 10-K for fiscal year ended 31 January 2026, 2026, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/885639/000119312526115982/kss-20260131.htm |
| Approximately 15.8% of U.S. retail sales and approximately 19.3% of online sales expected to be returned in 2025 (approximately $850B) | National Retail Federation and Happy Returns, "Consumers Expected to Return Nearly $850 Billion in Merchandise in 2025", 2025, https://nrf.com/media-center/press-releases/consumers-expected-to-return-nearly-850-billion-in-merchandise-in-2025 |
| UPS and FedEx average list-rate increases of approximately 5.9% for 2026 (UPS third year in a row); FedEx residential surcharge up approximately 8.4%; real shipper impact approximately 7--12% | LateShipment.com, "FedEx & UPS 2026 Rate Increases Explained", 2026, https://www.lateshipment.com/blog/fedex-ups-rates/ |
Free in the DrillCase case library · Editorial policy